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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Must human remains bear some relationship to a presently
existing tribe, people, or culture in order to be "Native American"
under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
("NAGPRA") and therefore be subject to its ownership
provisions?
2. Does transferring ownership of objects found on private
property to an Indian tribe under NAGPRA violate the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
where: (1) the transfer is based solely on the tribe's geographical
connection to the privately held land; (2) NAGPRA fails to
articulate any public purpose served by the transfer; and (3) the
owner of the private property receives no compensation as a result
of the transfer?
OPINIONS BELOW
The order and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Twelfth Circuit, reversing the decision of the district court, is
not reported. Chaco Nation of the Chaco Indian Reservation v.
Williamson, No. 12-1953 (12th Cir. Nov. 14, 2012). The order and
opinion of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of DePaulia, holding that the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq., does not
vest control of the disposition of the "Harper Man" in the Chaco
Nation and that the vesting of funerary objects associated with
Native American humans remains, which were removed from land
owned in fee simple by Dr. Edward Williamson, would constitute
an unconstitutional taking of property under the Fifth Amendment,
is reported. Chaco Nation of the Chaco Indian Reservation v.
Williamson, 311 F. Supp. 3d 1983 (N.D. Dep. 2011).
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Twelfth Circuit was entered on November 14. 2012. On November
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15, 2012, this Court granted Petitioner's writ of certiorari. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
STATUTORY PROVISION
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,
25 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq., requiring federal agencies and
institutions receiving federal funding to return Native American
human remains, funerary and sacred objects, and objects of
cultural patrimony to lineal descendants or culturally affiliated
Indian tribes, is reproduced in the Appendix of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case concerns the lawful scope of the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act ("NAGPRA"), Pub. L. No.
101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 3001
et seq.). The facts of this case demonstrate that over-broad
application of the statute will result in transfers of human remains
and cultural objects neither anticipated nor intended by Congress
in framing the statute.
Petitioner, Dr. Edward Williamson ("Dr. Williamson"), a retired
professor of ethnobiology at DePaulia University and a member of
the National Academy of Sciences, is the owner in fee simple of
Harper Springs Ranch-eighty acres of land, bounded on the east
by the Abiquiu River, which has been in possession of the
Williamson family since 1900. Chaco Nation of the Chaco Indian
Reservation v. Williamson, No. 12-1953, slip op. at 3 (12th Cir.
Nov. 14, 2012). Harper Springs Ranch is one of several non-Indian
owned allotments located within the exterior boundaries of the
present-day Chaco Indian Reservation and situated over 1,100
miles from the historical territories of the Respondent, the Chaco
Nation of the Chaco Indian Reservation, Depaulia ("Chaco
Nation"). Id. at 2-3.
In August 2008, flooding of the Abiquiu River created two
twenty-foot vertical escarpments ("Site I" and "Site II") on the
eastern boundary of Dr. Williamson's land. Id. at 3. While
surveying the damage, Dr. Williamson discovered human remains
embedded in the resulting sediment deposits at both sites, which
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were accompanied by two intact vessels ("jars") at Site II. Id. at 34. Concerned about the imminent threat of further flooding and
heavy rain, Williamson removed the ex situ remains and jars to his
house for protection. Id at 4.
After his discovery, Dr. Williamson promptly notified the
President of the Chaco Nation, and in full compliance with
DePaulia Stat. §862.05(4), contacted the local police, who
transferred the objects to the district medical examiner for
analysis. Id. The medical examiner determined that the objects
were not of recent origin and enlisted the assistance of Dr. Christie
Toth, an anthropologist at the local university, for further dating
and identification. Id.
Dr. Toth concluded that the human remains at Site II are Native
American, and identified the jars as Fancy IIIclb Ware, a rare
form of pottery belonging to the Early Riverine Horizon of Late
DePaulian Culture (A.D. 1300-1500). Id. In recent auctions, jars of
this type have sold for over $8,000 each-a price that will be
easily commanded by the Harper Springs Ranch jars, which are
fully intact vessels, painted inside and out. Id. at 4 n.4. Dr. Toth
also determined that the remains found at Site I, the so-called
"Harper Man,"' are approximately 14,000 years old, making it the
oldest and best-preserved human skeleton older than 8,000 years
ever discovered in the Americas. Id. at 5. Several of its physical
features - including the face and skull - differ from those of

modern American Indians. Id.
In January 2009, the Chaco Nation requested that Dr.
Williamson transfer to the tribe the jars and both sets of human
remains discovered on his land, although the Chaco Nation
concedes that it is not culturally affiliated with either the human
remains or the jars. Id. at 6 & n.7. While Dr. Williamson agreed to
transfer the Native American remains from Site II, he declined to
convey the "Harper Man" and the jars. Id. at 6. As a result, the
Chaco Nation filed the present action in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of DePaulia under section 15 of NAGPRA,
25 U.S.C. § 3013, alleging that Dr. Williamson had violated
1. The human remains discovered at Site 1I have come to be called the
"Harper Man," a term which is adopted in this brief, as in the proceedings of the
Twelfth Circuit Court of Appeals below.
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section 3 of NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3002 by retaining the "Harper
Man" and the jars. Id.
The Chaco Nation requested that the district court compel Dr.
Williamson to make the transfer by issuing an order to enforce the
ownership or control provisions of section 3(a)(2)(a) of NAGPRA,
25 U.S.C. § 3002 (a)(2)(A). Id. On cross-motions for summary
judgment, the district court denied both requests, holding: first,
that NAGPRA does not vest in the Chaco Nation control of the
14,000 year old "Harper Man" because NAGPRA's ownership
provisions apply only to human remains which bear some
relationship to a presently existing tribe, people or culture; and,
second, that vesting control in the Chaco Nation of the jars,
removed from land owned in fee simple by Dr. Williamson, would
constitute an unconstitutional taking of property under the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 6-7. On November 14, 2012, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit reversed this decision as
to both holdings. Id. at 7.
Dr. Williamson appeals the decision of the Twelfth Circuit and
presents two questions to this Court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Both challenges to the request of the Chaco Nation, for an order
compelling Dr. Williamson, to transfer control of the "Harper
Man" and jars under section 3(a)(2)(a) of NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. §
3002 (a)(2)(A) (2006), require this Court to reverse the decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit.
First, the decision should be reversed because NAGPRA's
ownership provisions apply only to "Native American" human
remains, which, under the statutory definition, must bear some
relationship to a presently existing Indian tribe. Under NAGPRA,
"Native American" is defined as "of, or relating to, a tribe, people
or culture that is indigenous to the United States." 25 U.S.C. §
3001(9) (emphasis added). Neither NAGPRA nor its implementing
regulations define the phrase "is indigenous." However, in
Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004), the
Ninth Circuit-the only circuit court other than the Twelfth Circuit
Court of Appeals to consider this question-interpreted the phrase
"is indigenous" as requiring a relationship to a presently existing
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Indian tribe. This Court should adopt the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit and reject the Twelfth Circuit's contrary construction for
two reasons. First, the principles of statutory interpretation require
that the definition of "Native American" be construed as relating
to a presently existing Indian tribe. The plain meaning of the
statutory language, particularly the use of the present tense, reveal
a Congressional intent to limit the reach of NAGPRA's ownership
provisions and, contrary to the reasoning of the Twelfth Circuit,
such a circumscribed definition neither leads to absurdities, nor
renders other provisions of the statute null. Second, such an
interpretation is consistent with the purposes underlying
NAGPRA's enactment.
Second, the decision should be reversed because without just
compensation, vesting ownership in the Chaco Nation of the
valuable jars removed from Dr. Williamson's property violates the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Under the common law
of finds, Dr. Williamson has a substantive, protected property
interest in the jars-an interest severable from an interest in the
associated human remains, because a burial including human
remains and associated funerary objects is not a unified res for
purposes of NAGPRA. Consequently, under this Court's Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence, transferring ownership of the jars
constitutes an unconstitutional taking for two reasons: first,
NAGPRA does not articulate a public purpose served by the
taking; and, second, even if NAGPRA serves a public purpose,
without just compensation, transferring ownership of the jars
violates the Fifth Amendment. For these reasons, Dr. Williamson
submits that the Twelfth Circuit erred in reversing the decision of
the district court and respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the decision of the Twelfth Circuit.
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ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TWELFTH
CIRCUIT'S DECISION BECAUSE THE PLAIN MEANING
AND PURPOSE OF NAGPRA'S OWNERSHIP PROVISIONS
REQUIRE A CIRCUMSCRIBED DEFINITION OF "NATIVE
JUST
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WILLIAMSON'S
CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT.
The over-broad interpretation of NAGPRA adopted in the
decision of the Twelfth Circuit Court of Appeals exceeds the plain
meaning and purpose of the statute, and contravenes the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In pertinent part, NAGPRA
provides for the disposition of "Native American" human remains
and cultural objects "excavated or discovered on Federal or tribal
lands after November 16, 1990." 25 U.S.C. § 3001(a). Dr.
Williamson does not dispute that for purposes of the statute, the
"Harper Man" and jars were discovered on "tribal land."2
Nonetheless, Dr. Williamson contests vesting control of these
items in the Chaco Nation for two independent reasons.
First, NAGPRA's ownership provisions do not apply to the
"Harper Man" because these remains are not "Native American"
under the statutory definition, which requires that human remains
bear some relationship to a presently existing Indian tribe to fall
within NAGPRA's purview. The plain meaning of the statutory
language, principles of statutory interpretation, and Congressional
intent in enacting NAGPRA demand this construction. Second,
because vesting control of the jars in the Chaco Nation would
constitute an uncompensated taking of Dr. Williamson's property
in violation of the Fifth Amendment, NAGPRA's ownership
provisions, 25 U.S.C. § 3002(3), do not apply to these objects.
Under this Court's jurisprudence, transferring ownership of the
jars without just compensation violates the Fifth Amendment
2. NAGPRA defines "tribal land" as including "all lands within the exterior
boundaries of any Indian reservation." 25 U.S.C. § 3001(15)(A).
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because Dr. Williamson has a constitutionally protected property
interest in the jars-an interest derived from the common law of
finds which is severable from any interest in the associated human
remains-and because NAGPRA does not articulate a public
purpose served by the transfer.
A. NAGPRA Does Not Vest Control of the "HarperMan" in the
Chaco Nation Because the Statute's Ownership ProvisionsApply
Only to Human Remains Which Bear Some Relationshipto a
Presently Existing Tribe, People or Culture
The Twelfth Circuit erred in holding that NAGPRA's ownership
provisions apply to the culturally unidentifiable, 14,000 year old
remains of the "Harper Man," Chaco Nation of the Chaco Indian
Reservation v. Williamson, No. 12-1953, slip op. at 6-7 (12th Cir.
Nov. 14, 2012) (construing 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9) (2006)), because
these remains, which bear no relationship to a presently existing
Indian tribe are not "Native American" under section 2(9) of
NAGPRA, 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9). NAGPRA defines "Native
American" as "of, or relating to, a tribe, people or culture that is
indigenous to the United States." 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9). Neither the
statute nor its implementing regulations further define the phrase
"is indigenous," however, in Bonnichsen, the Ninth Circuit
interpreted the phrase "as requiring a relationship to a presently
existing Indian tribe." 367 F.3d at 875, 877-78. This Court should
adopt the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit and reject the Twelfth
Circuit's contrary construction for two reasons. First, applying the
principles of statutory interpretation to this phrase, Congressional
intent to circumscribe the reach of NAGPRA's ownership
provisions to human remains relating to a presently existing tribe is
clear. This construction flows from plain meaning of the language,
particularly the use of the present tense, and neither leads to
absurdities nor renders null other provisions of NAGPRA. Second,
because NAGPRA was enacted to protect the interests, dignity,
and traditions of modem American Indians, the circumscribed
definition furthers the purposes of NAGPRA, while allowing for
the pursuit of governmental interests otherwise precluded by an
over-broad interpretation.
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1. The principles ofstatutory interpretationrequire a
circumscribeddefinition of "Native American"
In construing statutory language, it is well established that this
Court begins with the language of the statute itself. See, e.g.,
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001) (collecting cases). In
doing so, this Court "presume[s] that a legislature says in a statute
what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Conn.
Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). Accordingly,
absent Congressional intent to the contrary, courts "give the words
of a statute their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning."
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000); see also Perrin v.
United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
In applying these principles to NAGPRA's definition of "Native
American," this Court must conclude that the plain meaning of the
provision requires some relationship to a presently existing Indian
tribe. NAGPRA defines "Native American" as "of, or relating to, a
tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to the United States." 25
U.S.C. § 3001 (2006). Although the phrase "is indigenous" is not
further defined in NAGPRA or its implementing regulations,
Congressional use of the present tense elucidates the provision's
meaning. This Court has repeatedly held that Congressional use of
the present tense is significant in interpreting statutory language.
United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992) ("Congress' use
of a verb tense is significant in construing statutes"); see also Carr
v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010) ("Consistent with normal
usage, we have frequently looked to Congress' choice of verb
tense to ascertain a statute's temporal reach"). In particular, this
Court has reasoned that where "Congress could have phrased its
requirement in language that looked to the past ... but it did not
choose this readily available option," Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.
v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987), the
chosen verb tense reveals a specific intent to exclude the past, see
Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2234. Consequently, in defining "Native
American" as relating to an Indian tribe that is indigenous, the
provision should be read as excluding tribes, peoples or cultures
that were once indigenous to the United States, but are no longer
in existence.
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The Ninth Circuit-the only circuit court other than the Twelfth
Circuit to construe this provision--came to the same conclusion in
Bonnichsen, holding that NAGPRA's ownership provisions did
not apply to the remains of the so-called "Kennewick Man," a
9,000 year old, culturally unidentifiable skeleton discovered near
Kennewick, Washington, because the statutory definition of
"Native American" requires that the remains bear some
relationship to a presently existing Indian tribe. 367 F.3d at 869. In
so holding, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congressional use of
the present tense, as well as the "ordinary [and] natural meaning"
of the phrase "is indigenous," clearly demonstrated that "Congress
was referring to presently existing Indian tribes" in defining
"Native American" for purposes of NAGPRA. Id. at 875.
This interpretation is further supported when this provision is
considered within the broader context of the statute. The
distinction between past and present is important to many of the
NAGPRA's provisions. For example, "cultural affiliation" is
defined as "a relationship . .. which can be reasonably traced

historically or prehistorically between a present day Indian
tribe ... and an identifiable earlier group." 25 U.S.C. § 3001(2)
(emphasis added). Additionally, NAGPRA defines sacred objects"
as "specific ceremonial objects needed . .. for the practice of

traditional Native American religions by their present day
adherents." 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(c) (emphasis added). These and
other provisions indicate that in enacting NAGPRA, where
Congress intended to recognize past groups in addition to present
day Indian tribes, it did so explicitly.
By contrast, where Congress intended to refer only to presently
existing groups in the context of NAGPRA, Congress merely used
the present tense. Thus, NAGPRA defines "Native American" as
relating to an Indian tribe which "is indigenous" to the United
States, 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9), and defines "Indian tribe" as "any
tribe, band, nation ... which is recognized as eligible for the
special programs and services provided by the United States to
Indians because of their status as Indians." 25 U.S.C. § 3001(7)
(emphasis added). Both provisions deliberately employ the present
tense, and to avoid incongruities, these neighboring verbs should
be similarly construed. Accordingly, because the Chaco Nation
contends that "is indigenous" should be construed as including
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tribes that were once but are no longer in existence, following this
logic "is recognized" must similarly be construed as applying to
those tribes that were once but are no longer recognized as eligible
for special programs and services. See Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2237
(applying the same logic in construing Congressional use of the
present tense in the Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act, Pub. L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 590). Such a construction would
deprive presently existing groups of their status as "Indian tribes"
under the statute, limiting NAGPRA's reach only to those groups
that once were, but no longer are recognized by the U.S.
government as Indians. Such a construction of the definition of
"Indian tribes" would be nonsensical given that NAGPRA's
purpose is "to benefit modem American Indians." See Bonnichsen,
367 F.3d at 876 ("NAGPRA was intended to benefit modem
American Indians by sparing them the indignity and resentment
that would be aroused by the despoiling of their ancestors' graves
and the study or the display of their ancestors' remains.") (citing
H.R.Rep. No. 101-877, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4369). Because
such a reading of the present tense in the phrase "is recognized"
does not accord with the purposes of the statute, and because
Congress presumably employed the same verb tense for the same
purpose in neighboring definitional provisions, it similarly must be
presumed that the Chaco Nation's interpretation of "is indigenous"
cannot be sustained with respect to the definition of "Native
American."
Furthermore, in NAGPRA's language, where Congress wished
to signify a people existing prior to the formation of the United
States, Congress did so explicitly. For example, "Native
Hawaiian" is defined in NAGPRA as "any individual who is a
descendant of the aboriginal people who, prior to 1778, occupied
and exercised sovereignty in the area that now constitutes the State
of Hawaii." 25 U.S.C. § 3001(10). By contrast, the statute defines
"Native American" as "of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture
that is indigenous to the United States." 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9)
(emphasis added). Thus in defining "Native Hawaiians," Congress
intentionally and expressly included aboriginal peoples predating
the formation of the union, but did not do so in defining "Native
American." This Court has held that rejection of readily available
linguistic alternatives is significant in interpreting Congressional
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intent. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57. Consequently, the phrase "is
indigenous to the United States" cannot be reasonably be
construed as referring to a people who inhabited the territory that
is now the United States millennia prior to its formation. Further, if
"Native American" were interpreted as including tribes who once
existed in the territory that is now the United States prior to its
formation, then the term "Native Hawaiian" would be redundant
and unnecessary, since the groups referred to would already be
included under the statute. Consequently, as the Twelfth Circuit
noted, such a construction is untenable, as "statutes must be
construed so that no word or clause is rendered surplusage or
null." Williamson, No. 12-1953, slip op. at 11 (citing Hohn v.
United States, 524 U.S. 236, 249 (1998)).
For all of these reasons, NAGPRA "unambiguously requires that
human remains bear some relationship to a presently existing tribe,
people, or culture to be considered Native American." Bonnichsen,
367 F.3d at 875 (emphasis added). A mere claim of ambiguity
does not ipsofacto render the statute ambiguous. Accordingly, the
Twelfth Circuit's reliance on the Indian canon of construction,
whereby statutes passed for the benefit of Indian tribes are "to be
liberally construed, [with] doubtful expressions being resolved in
favor of the Indians," Williamson, No. 12-1953, slip op. at 12
(quoting Bryan v. Itasca County, Minn., 426 U.S. 373, 396
(1976)), is misplaced. While Congress undeniably enacted
NAGPRA to benefit Native Americans, "the Indian canon of
construction cannot be used to contradict an unambiguous statute."
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 467,
478 (Fed. Cl. 2006). Furthermore, the purpose of resolving
ambiguous provisions liberally in favor of the Indians is "to
comport with ... traditional notions of sovereignty and with the
federal policy of encouraging tribal independence." Id. (quoting
Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 729
(9th Cir. 2003)). Protecting the graves of individuals bearing no
relationship to a presently existing tribe, people, or culture does
not advance this purpose, since tribes no longer in existence have
no independence or sovereignty to protect. Finally, even if the
statute were ambiguous, the Indian canon of construction would
not necessarily require a broad interpretation of the statute. The
canon requires interpretation "liberally in favor of the Indians."
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Id. But a liberal interpretation does not dispose of other principles
of statutory interpretation; it merely grants them less interpretive
weight. Here, the cumulative persuasiveness of the traditional
principles, even under a liberal interpretation, strongly suggests a
circumscribed construction of the statutory definition of "Native
American."
Contrary to the Twelfth Circuit's conclusions, this
circumscribed definition of "Native American" does not lead to
absurd results. According to the Twelfth Circuit, if the definition
of "Native American" requires a relationship to some presently
existing Indian tribe, "Native American-ness becomes mutable one day you're in, and the next day you're out. . . We consider
that result to be absurd." Williamson, No. 12-1953, slip op. at 11.
While it might seem illogical if the "mere passage of time" could
alter whether an individual was or was not Native American, this
argument sidesteps the actual issue before this Court. As noted in
the dissenting opinion below, what is at stake is not "whether the
human remains of Harper Man are Native American," but rather,
whether those remains are "Native American for purposes of
NAGPRA." Williamson, No. 12-1953, slip op. at 20 (Lemoncelli,
J., dissenting). While "Native American" is used colloquially to
denote genetic, cultural, ethnic, religious and other arguably
immutable characteristics and relationships of the sort which seem
to have concerned the Twelfth Circuit, consideration of any of
these extra-statutory definitions is fundamentally at odds with the
principles of statutory interpretation. Whether the definition for a
word provided in a statute to explain the scope of that word's
meaning within the statute accords with other meanings for that
term beyond the statute is irrelevant to the judicial project of
statutory construction.
That human remains which are today "Native American," by
virtue of their affiliation with a presently existing tribe indigenous
to the United States, might not be "Native American" in 14,000
years is in perfect accordance with both language and logic. The
passage of time, by its capacity to change relations, may alter the
applicability of terms to their objects. For example, a woman may
be described as "married," but the passage of time and the death of
her spouse will alter the applicability of this term to that same
woman. The woman is one day married; the next she is not. So too
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might time alter the applicability of the term "Native American" to
human remains for purposes of NAGPRA, as tribes cease to exist
over time. Nevertheless, the Twelfth Circuit concludes -without
argument - that the applicability of "Native American" to a tribe,
people, or culture is not the sort of thing that changes over time, as
a straightforward interpretation of the statute would imply.
Neither does requiring a relationship to some presently existing
Indian tribe render NAGPRA's provisions concerning "culturally
unidentifiable human remains" null, as the Twelfth Circuit
resolved. Williamson, No. 12-1953, slip op. at 12 (concluding that
"if only remains with a relationship to a presently-existing tribe
would qualify as 'Native American,' there would be no such thing
as 'culturally unidentifiable human remains"'). This conclusion
misinterprets the plain meaning of the statute. NAGPRA mandates
a two-part inquiry when determining whether human remains or
cultural objects are subject to its provisions: (1) "whether the
human remains are Native American within the meaning of
NAGPRA;" and, (2) "if they are, then the requirements of
NAGPRA attach, and an inquiry into the allocation of ownership
or control is conducted." Id. at 8-9 (citing Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at
875). Consequently, it is possible that human remains can be
"Native American" for purposes of the statute, but not readily
identifiable as belonging to any particulartribe.
The provisions concerning the disposition of "culturally
unidentifiable human remains" confirm that Congress anticipated,
and in fact provided for, just this scenario. For example, NAGPRA
provides for the formation of a federal committee to review the
statute's implementation, with responsibilities that include
"reviewing and making findings related to the identity or cultural
affiliation of cultural items, or the return of such items." 25 U.S.C.
§ 3006(c)(3)-(5). This provision reveals the fact that Congress
foresaw that determining the specific cultural affiliation of Native
American human remains or objects might be disputed or not
readily achieved-and empowered a review committee to make
decisions in unclear cases. Similarly, NAGPRA provides that "if
the cultural affiliation of the objects cannot be reasonably
ascertainedand if the objects were discovered on Federal land that
is recognized by a final judgment of the Indian Claims
Commission or the United States Court of Claims as the aboriginal
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land of some Indian tribe," then those objects belong to the tribe
which aboriginally occupied that land, if "such tribe states a claim
for such remains or objects." 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(C). It is
evident from these and similar provisions that Congress used the
term "culturally unidentifiable human remains" to refer to those
remains which, though Native American have not been or cannot
be readily shown to belong to a particulartribe. For all of these
reasons, applying the principles of interpretation to the plain
language of statute requires a relationship to some presently
existing Indian tribe to be considered "Native American" for
purposes of NAGPRA.
2. Construing "Native American" broadly does not accord with
the purposes of NA GPRA
Second, a broad interpretation of "Native American" is neither
required by NAGPRA nor in accordance with its purposes.
NAGPRA was enacted "to respect the burial traditions of modemday American Indians and to protect the dignity of the human body
after death." Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 876. The statute was
intended "to benefit modem American Indians by sparing them the
indignity and resentment that would be aroused by the despoiling
of their ancestors' graves and the study or the display of their
ancestors' remains." Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-877 (1990),
reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4369). It is thus evident that
"Congress's purposes would not be served by requiring the
transfer to modem American Indians of human remains that bear
no relationship to them." Id. Nevertheless, the Chaco Nation
would give "Native American status to any remains found within
the United States regardless of age and regardless of lack of
connection to existing indigenous tribes." Id. Such an aim is not
supported
by
NAGPRA.
While the broad interpretation of "Native American" espoused
by the Chaco Nation would also serve the purpose of NAGPRAinsofar as to benefit all tribes that have ever been indigenous to the
United States would certainly also benefit those that are presently
indigenous-such
an
all-encompassing
interpretation
of
NAGPRA's purpose is at odds with the statute's language. For
example, NAGPRA's text explicitly acknowledges another interest
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in human remains and objects possessed by federal agencies and
institutions such as museums: "culturally affiliated Native
American cultural items ... shall [be expeditiously returned] ...
unless such items are indispensable for completion of a specific
scientific study, the outcome of which would be a major benefit to
the United States." 25 U.S.C. § 3005(5)(b). This provision
qualifies the statutory standard for repatriation of items owned by
Federal agencies or museums. While this provision does not apply
to the remains of the "Harper Man," because these remains are not
in the possession of a Federal agency or institution receiving
federal funding-the provision nonetheless illustrates that the
statute anticipates other interests, such as a science, which are at
odds with the over-broad interpretation of "Native American"
advanced by the Chaco Nation.
Finally, the Harper Man is so temporally and biologically
removed from modem American Indians that it cannot be "Native
American" within the sense of the statute. NAGPRA, enacted for
the interests of modem-day American Indian descendants and their
ancestors, Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 876, provides for the proper
ownership of "Native American" human remains. 25 U.S.C. §
3002(a). Yet Harper Man "attracted attention because some of its
physical features-such as the shape of the face and skulldiffered from those of modern American Indians." Williamson, No.
12-1953, slip op. at 5 (emphasis added). In other words, Harper
Man is so temporally removed from modern American Indians, in
whose interests NAGPRA was enacted, as to possess salient
biological and structural distinctions. Such a person can hardly be
called an "ancestor" to modern American Indians in the sense of
the statute. See Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 879 ("Human remains that
are 8,340 to 9,200 years old and that bear only incidental genetic
resemblance to modern-day American Indians, along with
incidental genetic resemblance to other peoples, cannot be said to
be the Indians' 'ancestors' within Congress's meaning"). Yet
according to the Twelfth Circuit, any prior inhabitant of what is
presently the territory of the United States would be an ancestor to
the modem Native Americans. This would not serve the purposes
of NAGPRA. See id. ("Congress enacted NAGPRA to give
American Indians control over the remains of their genetic and
cultural forbearers, not over the remains of people bearing no
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special and significant genetic or cultural relationship to some
presently existing indigenous tribe, people, or culture.") (emphasis
added).
For these reasons, this Court should reverse the decision of the
Twelfth Circuit because a circumscribed interpretation of "Native
American" under NAGPRA, whereby "Native American" means
"[bearing] some relationship to a presently existing tribe, people,
or culture," is not only required by the principles of statutory
interpretation, but also best accords with NAGPRA's purpose.
B. Without Just Compensation, Vesting Ownership of the Jars
Removed From Dr. Williamson's Property Violates the Fifth

Amendment Takings Clause
The Twelfth Circuit also erred in holding that vesting ownership
in the Chaco Nation of the jars found on Dr. Williamson's
property was permissible under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Although Congress has the authority to regulate
affairs between the Federal government and Native American
tribes, Congress cannot exercise that authority in a way which
violates other Constitutional rights, including the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee that the government will not take private
property for a public use without just compensation. Without just
compensation, vesting ownership in the jars found embedded in
Dr. Williamson's property violates this prohibition for three
reasons. First, under the common law of finds, Dr. Williamson has
a protected property interest in the jars, while the Chaco Nation
has no such interest. Second, Dr. Williamson's interest in the jars
is severable from an interest in the associated remains. Third,
because Dr. Williamson has a protected interest in the jars,
physical appropriation of these objects, without serving a public
purpose and without just compensation, is an unconstitutional
"taking" under this Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. For
these reasons, this Court should hold that vesting ownership of the
associated jars in the Chaco Nation is an unconstitutional taking of
property, and accordingly, under 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(f)(2)(iv), the
actions authorized by NAGPRA do not apply to Dr. Williamson's
land with respect to these objects.
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1. Under the common law offinds, Dr. Williamson has a protected
interest in the jarssuperiorto any interest claimed by the
Chaco Nation
Vesting control in the Chaco Nation of the associated jars
infringes on Dr. Williamson's constitutionally protected property
interest in those objects. This Court has held that property interests
"are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits." Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). If state law or some other
source creates a substantive property interest, whether this right
"rises to the level of a constitutionally protected property interest,"
Williamson, No. 12-1953, at 14, is determined by federal
constitutional law. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436
U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972)).
In the American common law tradition, it is well established
under the so-called "law of finds" that Dr. Williamson has a
substantive property interest in the jars which he discovered
embedded in his own land. The American common law of finds
provides for the disposition of unclaimed, previously owned
personal property depending on the circumstances of the object's
loss. Patty Gerstenblith, Common Law, Statutory Law and the
Disposition of ArchaeologicalResources in the United States, Art
& Cultural Heritage Law Newsletter (Art & Cultural Heritage Law
Committee), Winter 2012, at 8. The law of finds traditionally
divided personal property into five categories, one of which"embedded property"-is applicable to the case at hand, giving
rise to a substantive, constitutionally protected property interest in
the jars discovered on Dr. Williamson's property.3
Dr. Williamson has a Fifth Amendment interest in the jars
because under the common-law of finds, property embedded in the
3. The other categories are: (1) lost property; (2) mislaid property; (3)
treasure troves; and (4) abandoned property. These categories are not applicable
to the case at hand. See Gerstenblith, supra, at 8-9, 10; Williamson, No. 121953, at 17.
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soil belongs to the owner of the real property where it is found.
Embedded property-"property not made of gold, silver, or their
paper equivalents, found buried or embedded in the ground"-has
the "greatest relevance to archaeological objects" like the jars. See
id. at 9 (citing Allred v. Biegel, 240 Mo. App. 818 (1949) (holding
that a Native American canoe was embedded property, which
therefore belonged to the owner of the real property in which it
was found)). Under common-law traditions, ownership of
embedded property accrues to the owner of the real property in
which the object is embedded. Id.; Williamson, No. 12-1953, at 26
(Lemoncelli, J., dissenting) ("absent a true owner, property
embedded in the soil ... belongs to the owner of the locus in
quo."). Consequently, under the common law of finds, Dr.
Williamson has a protected interest in the associated jars because
they were discovered embedded in his property. See In re Search
and Seizure of Shivers, 890 F. Supp. 613, 615 (E.D. Tex. 1995)
("[A]bandoned property embedded in the soil belongs to the owner
of the soil."); Klein v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Bishop v.
Ellsworth, 234 N.E.2d 49 (111. App. Ct. 1968); Flax v. Monticello
Realty Co., 39 S.E.2d 308 (Va. 1946)); Schley v. Couch, 284
S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 1955)); see also Jennifer R. Richman,
NAGPRA: Constitutionally Adequate?, in Legal Perspectives on
Cultural Resources 216, 220 (Jennifer R. Richman & Marion P.
Forsyth eds. 2004) (arguing that a buried object "would likely be
classified as embedded property, with ownership assigned to the
owner of the real property in which the personal property is
embedded," giving rise to a Fifth Amendment property interest,
qualifying as a taking under NAGPRA).
Further, Dr. Williamson's substantive property interest is prior
to any such interest that can be claimed by the Chaco Nation. At
no point has the Chaco Nation claimed to be the true owner of the
jars, nor is there any evidence supporting such an assertion.
Williamson, No. 12-11953, slip op. at 27 (Lemoncelli, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Chaco Nation is not the true owner of the two
ceramic vessels embedded in Williamson's land."). Thus,
NAGPRA supplies the only possible source that can provide the
Chaco Nation with an interest in the jars. NAGPRA provides for
the disposition of funerary objects associated with a Native
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American burial discovered on tribal lands, such as the jars,
according to a hierarchy of interests. The statute recognizes a
primary interest in the lineal descendants of the Native American
human remains with which the objects are associated. 25 U.S.C. §
3002(a)(1). There is no evidence in the record that the Chaco
Nation or any of its tribal members are lineal descendants of the
Native American buried at Site II, nor has the Chaco Nation or any
other individual made any such claim.
Where, as here, no lineal descendants of the Native American
human remains can be identified, NAGPRA vests ownership or
control either (1) "in the Indian tribe . .. on whose tribal land such

objects were discovered," (2) "in the Indian tribe . . . which has the
closest cultural affiliation with such [] objects," or (3) "if the
cultural affiliation of the objects cannot be reasonably ascertained
and if the objects were discovered on Federal land that is
recognized ... as the aboriginal land of some Indian tribe," in the
Indian tribe "recognized as aboriginallyoccupying the area" or in
a different tribe with a "stronger cultural relationship to the
objects." 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(A)-(C) (emphasis added). As
noted below, "the Chaco Nation concedes that the tribe is not
culturally affiliated with either the human remains or the
associated funerary objects in question," Williamson, No. 12-1953,
slip op. 6 n.7, and consequently has no claim to the jars under 25
U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(B). Further, there is no indication in the
record that the Chaco Indian Reservation is "recognized as the
aboriginal land" of either the Chaco Nation or any other Indian
tribe so as to create an interest in the jars under 25 U.S.C. §
3002(a)(2)(C). In fact, while the term "aboriginally occupying" is
not defined in the statute, the record strongly suggests that under
any conventional understanding of the phrase, the Chaco Indian
Reservation cannot be understood as the "aboriginal land" of the
Chaco Nation, a tribe that "historically. . . lived more than 1,100
miles from the present-day Chaco Indian Reservation."
Williamson, No. 12-1953, slip op. at 2.
Consequently, the only possible claim that the Chaco Nation can
assert as providing an interest in the jars stems from their
discovery on Dr. Williamson's private property located within the
exterior boundaries of the Chaco Indian Reservation. See 25
U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(A). While Dr. Williamson concedes that
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under NAGPRA, these lands are deemed "tribal land," 25 U.S.C. §
3001(15)(A), nonetheless, as the dissent concluded below, Dr.
Williamson's firmly-established, common-law interest in the jars
is superior to the Chaco Nation's claim, based purely on physical
occupation of the Chaco Indian Reservation since 1854.
Williamson, No. 12-1953, slip op. at 27 (Lemoncelli, J.,
dissenting) ("[A]s between Williamson and the Chaco Nation,
Williamson's right in this property is superior to that of the Chaco
Nation."). NAGPRA's implementing regulations anticipate just
this scenario-in which an individual's superior property interest
will be constitutionally infringed by vesting ownership in an
Indian tribe under NAGPRA-and provide that NAGPRA "will
not apply to tribal lands to the extent that any action would result
in a taking of property" 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(f)(2)(iv). Accordingly,
Dr. Williamson has a constitutionally protected, substantive
property interest in the jars which is prior to any possible interest
that can be asserted by the Chaco Nation.
2. The jars and the associatedhuman remains are not a legally
unified res
Although the Twelfth Circuit recognized that Dr. Williamson
had a well-established, common law interest in the jars discovered
embedded in his real property, Williamson, No. 12-1593, at 14-15,
the court nonetheless held that transferring ownership of the jars
did not constitute a taking, erroneously concluding that Dr.
Williamson's unmistakable interest was not severable from "rights
or interest in human remains in the [associated] burial." Id. at 16.
Because the Twelfth Circuit conflated these severable interests,
and because Dr. Williamson does not have an "interest in the
Native American human remains of the individual in the burial at
Site II," the Twelfth Circuit held that he "likewise does not have
any constitutionally protected right or interest in the funerary
objects associated with the burial." Id. at 18. While Dr.
Williamson concedes that he does not have a property interest in
the Native American remains associated with the jars found at Site
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II,4 this interest is legally distinct from Dr. Williamson's
constitutionally protected, substantive interest in the jars for two
reasons: first, there is no basis either in NAGPRA or its
implementing regulations for treating human remains and
associated funerary objects as a unified res; and, second, human
remains and associated funerary objects were not considered a
unified res in the English common law tradition.
First, neither the text of NAGPRA, nor its implementing
regulations support the treatment of a burial containing human
remains and associated objects as a legally unified res. Although
the Twelfth Circuit held that "a burial or grave is a unified res,"
Williamson, No. 12-1953, at 17-18, under NAGPRA a "burial" is
defined only with reference to the human remains it contains; the
statutory definition omits any mention of objects associated with
those remains. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(1) ("Burial site means any natural
or prepared physical location, whether originally below, on, or
above the surface of the earth, into which as a part of the death rite
or ceremony of a culture, individual human remains are
deposited."). NAGPRA independently defines "associated
funerary objects," 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(a), demonstrating that in
the same section of the statute, where Congress intended to refer to
the objects associated with buried human remains it did so.
Further, under the statute, human remains and associated burial
objects constitute two of five subcategories of "cultural items,"
each of which is separately defined and receives distinct treatment
throughout NAGPRA. See id § 3001(3). These statutory
provisions simply do not support an inference that Congress

4. While the common law recognized a "quasi-property right" in next-of-kin
of a deceased individual to control disposition of the decedent's remains, see,
e.g., Whitehair v. HighlandMemory Gardens,Inc., 174 W.Va. 458, 460-61 (W.
Va. App. 1985); Long v. Chicago, R.I. & P. RY. Co., 15 Okla. 512 (1905); Foley
v. Phelps, 37 N.Y.S. 471 (1896); Seals v. H & F, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 237 (Tenn.
2010), a right which has been extended to Indian tribes culturally affiliated with
the human remains of the decedent, see Charrierv. Bell, 496 So.2d 601, 601
(1986), Dr. Williamson concedes that he is not a relative of the decedent or a
member of a tribe affiliated with the human remains discovered in Site II,
Williamson, No. 12-1953, at 6 n.7.
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intended human remains and associated objects to be treated as a
unified res under NAGPRA.5
Furthermore, the implementing regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of the Interior-the executive agency charged with
interpreting the statute-reveal that the Secretary does not
consider human remains and associated objects to be a unified res
under NAGPRA. See Williamson, No. 12-1953, at 24-25
(Lemoncelli, J., dissenting). This Court's decision in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat'1 Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
provides the standard of review for statutory interpretations by the
agency charged with the statute's enforcement. Under the Chevron
standard, where a statute clearly addresses "the precise question at
issue," the court "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress." Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217-18
(2002) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43). However, where a
statute "is silent or ambiguous", the court "must sustain the
Agency 's interpretation if it is 'based on a permissible
construction' of the Act." Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84243) (emphasis added).
Because NAGPRA vests authority in the Secretary of the
Interior to enforce its provisions, 25 U.S.C. § 3011, and because
the statute does not speak to the "precise question" of whether an
individual can have a Fifth Amendment possessory interest in
associated funerary objects such that transfer of ownership would
constitute a taking, the Secretary's interpretation of the question is
entitled to Chevron deference.6 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 ("We
5. Although the Twelfth Circuit found support for its treatment of human
remains and associated funerary objects in the Archaeological Resources
Protection Act ("ARPA"), 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(l) (2006), Williamson, No. 121953, at 18, ARPA's statutory language, like that of NAGPRA, does not support
this conclusion. ARPA defines a "grave" as a protected "archaeological
resource" for purposes of that statute; the statute independently defines "human
skeletal remains" as an "archaeological resource." 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(l). Thus,
as under NAGPRA, ARPA treats human remains distinctly from other items in
the burial.
6. In Bonnichsen, the Ninth Circuit recently held that the Secretary's
interpretation of the definition of "Native American" was not entitled to
Chevron deference, because the court found that the Secretary's interpretation
contradicted the definition provided by the statute. 367 F.3d at 877; see
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have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded
to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it
is entrusted to administer. . . .").

Implementing regulations and accompanying commentary
reveal that under the Secretary's interpretation human remains and
associated burial goods are not a unified res. For example, the
Secretary promulgated 43 C.F.R. § 10.11(c), which provides for
mandatory disposition of culturally unidentifiable human remains,
but discretionary disposition of objects associated with the
culturally unidentifiable human remains. Compare 43 C.F.R. §
10.11 (c)(1) ("A museum or Federal agency that is unable to prove
that it has a right of possession . .. to culturally identifiable human
remains must offer to transfer control ...

.")

and 43 C.F.R. §

10.11(c)(4) ("A museum or Federal agency may also transfer
control of funerary objects that are associated with culturally
unidentifiable human remains."). In announcing this rule, the
Secretary provided commentary explaining the distinct treatment
of human remains and associated objects:
In section 8(c)(5) of the Act (25 U.S.C. 3006(c)(5)),
Congress assigned the role of recommending
specific actions for developing a process for
disposition of culturally unidentifiable human
remains to the Review Committee. Congress did
not indicate the same intent regarding culturally
unidentifiable
associated
funerary
objects.
Mandatory disposition for this category of items
raises right ofpossession and takings issues that are
not clearly resolved in the statute or the legislative
history. American common law generally
recognizes that human remains cannot be owned.

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."). By contrast, Congress has not
unambiguously expressed its intent on the question of whether transfer of
control or ownership in associated funerary objects would constitute a taking
under the Fifth Amendment; consequently, the Secretary's interpretation on this
question is entitled to Chevron deference.
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The common law regarding associated funerary
objects that are not culturally identifiable is not well
established ... Considering the lack of precedent in
the common law and Congress' direction to develop
a process only with respect to culturally
unidentifiable human remains, the Secretary does
not consider it appropriate to make the provision to
transfer
culturally
unidentifiable
associated
funerary objects mandatory.
75 Fed. Reg. 12, 378, 12,398 (Mar. 15, 2010) (emphasis added).
Both the regulation and commentary demonstrate that the
Secretary has interpreted NAGPRA's provisions as applying
differently to culturally unaffiliated human remains and to the
associated funerary objects. Under this interpretation, human
remains and associated funerary objects are clearly not a unified
res for purposes of NAGPRA. Because the Secretary's
interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference, this Court "must
sustain the Agency's interpretation," Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43,
and, accordingly, must not treat human remains and associated
objects as a unified res.
Second, in addition to the fact that neither the statute nor its
implementing regulations support the Twelfth Circuit's theory that
human remains and associated burial objects are a unified res,
common law tradition similarly provides no support for treating
human remains and associated objects as a legally unified res.'
American common law tradition derives from English common
law, and at English common law, burial objects were considered
property severable from the human remains with which they were
buried.! See Williamson, No. 12-1953, slip op. at 25-26. For
7. But see, Patty Gerstenblith, Protection of Cultural Heritage Found on
Private Land: The Paradigm of the Miami Circle and Regulatory Takings
Doctrine after Lucas, 13 St. Thomas L. Rev. 65, 99-100 (2000) (arguing that at
common law human remains and often associated grave goods were not
property).
8. By contrast, in the French common law tradition, burial objects were not
considered either treasure or abandoned property and were not subject to
ownership claims by finders. See Charrier, 496 So. 2d at 605 (construing
French common law in determining a NAGPRA claim). For this reason the
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example, in the English common law, "a person who removed the
corpse from the grave was guilty of a larceny of things buried with
the corpse but not [the corpse]." Hugh Y. Bernard, The Law of
Death andDisposal of the Dead 16 (1979) (emphasis added).
In concluding otherwise, the Twelfth Circuit relied extensively
on the reasoning of the court in Charrierv. Bell, 496 So.2d 601,
601 (1986). In doing so the Twelfth Circuit erred; the reasoning of
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit of Louisiana in Charrier
is not relevant because Louisiana is unique among American
jurisdictions in drawing its occupancy law from French, rather
than English common law. See Charrier,496 So.2d at 605. Unlike
the Anglo-American tradition, at French common law, burial
objects were not considered either treasure or abandoned property
and were not subject to ownership claims by finders. See id.
(construing French common law in determining a NAGPRA
claim). For this reason the reasoning of the court in Charrieris not
applicable to the case at hand.
The Twelfth Circuit was also mistaken in relying on
maritime/admiralty law. The treatment of a shipwreck as a unified
res under maritime/admiralty law is neither relevant to the inquiry
at hand, nor does it provide support for the Twelfth Circuit's
holding. See Williamson, No. 12-1953, slip op. at 18 n.13 (arguing
that the maritime law treatment of shipwrecks as a unified res
supports the holding that human remains and associated funerary
objects are a unified res). While maritime/admiralty law generally
treats the whole shipwreck as a legally unified res, see California
v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1998), this
principle applies to property found on a sunken vessel. Maritime
law almost universally contains special and distinct provisions for
the treatment and disposition of human remains discovered on
shipwrecks, clearly indicating that human remains are not
considered property for purposes of the res. See, e.g., Jason R.
Harris, The Protection of Sunken Warships As Gravesites at Sea, 7
Ocean & Coastal L.J. 75, 122-25 (2001) (discussing provisions in
U.S. and international law concerning the treatment of human
Charriercourt's reasoning is not applicable to the case at hand; Louisiana is
unique among American jurisdictions in drawing its occupancy law from
French, rather than English common law. See id. at 605.
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remains discovered in sunken warships). Accordingly, there is no
basis in common law, or in NAGPRA's text and implementing
regulations for concluding that human remains and associated
funerary objects are a unified res. For these reasons, this Court
should find that human remains and the associated funerary objects
are not a legally unified res, and consequently, that Dr.
Williamson's well established interest in the jars found at Site II is
severable from an interest in the human remains associated with
those objects.
3. Transferringownership of the jars without compensation and
without Congressionalarticulationof a public purpose is an
unconstitutionaltaking
Since Dr. Williamson has a substantive property interest in the
jars, vesting ownership of these objects in the Chaco Nation is an
unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Although the Indian Commerce Clause authorizes
Congress to regulate affairs between the Federal government and
Native American tribes,9 "including the authority to enact statutes
for the benefit of Indians, such as those protecting Native
American graves," Congress cannot exercise this power in a way
which "effect[s] an uncompensated taking of private property."
Williamson, No. 12-1953, slip op. at 8. The Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment requires that the government justly compensate
individuals whose "private property [is] taken for public use," U.S.
Const. amend V, in order to ensure that the government does not
"forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001) (quoting
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). Vesting
ownership of the jars in the Chaco Nation flies in the face of this
constitutional protection for three reasons: first, under this Court's
jurisprudence, physical appropriation of personal property under
NAGPRA is clearly a taking; second, this taking does not serve a
9. Article I, section 3, clause 8 grants Congress the authority "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes . . . ." U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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Congressionally articulated public purpose; and, third, even if
NAGPRA does serve a public purpose, NAGPRA contains no
compensation provision to "just[ly] compensate" Dr. Williamson
for the loss of his valuable property.
First, transferring ownership of the jars is the "quintessential
form of 'taking': physical appropriation of tangible property.
Daniel J. Hurtado, Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act: Does It Subject Museums To An
Unconstitutional "Taking"?, 6 Hofstra Prop. L. J. 1, 8 (1993). It is
well established by this Court that the Takings Clause is
implicated "[w]here the government authorizes a physical
occupation of property. . . ." Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S.

519, 522 (1992). While vesting ownership of the jars constitutes a
physical appropriation of chattels, rather than the occupation of
real property, the fundamental principle articulated in this Court's
takings jurisprudence nonetheless applies: "When the characterof
the governmental action is a permanent physical occupation of
property, our cases uniformly have found a taking. . . ." Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35
(internal quotations and citations omitted). This Court has also
held that a government action constitutes a "taking" where it
requires that the property owner "sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses" for the property. Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); see also Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (applying this destruction of value theory
to personal property). Because transferring ownership of the jars
would "eliminate their value to the prior possessor," Dr.
Williamson, vesting ownership of the valuable jars in the Chaco
Nation also constitutes a taking under this "destruction of value"
theory. See Hurtado, supra, at 14 (emphasis added). Consequently,
transferring ownership or control of the associated objects from
Dr. Williamson to the Chaco Nation is clearly a "taking" for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment. See Hurtado, supra, at 14.
Second, vesting ownership of the jars in the Chaco Nation is a
taking that does not serve any public purpose articulated by
Congress in NAGPRA. While this Court gives considerable
deference to legislative determinations that a taking satisfies a
public purpose, see, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32
(1954); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005),
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even where legislation transfers property ownership from one
private party to another, see Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
467 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1984) (upholding a Hawaii statute requiring
the transfer of real property from private owners to other private
parties), this Court has always required that the legislature at a
minimum articulate the public purpose being served, see Berman,
348 U.S. at 32 (articulating a standard of deference to legislative
determinations that a taking serves a public purpose "when the
legislature has spoken") (emphasis added).
In this case, NAGPRA utterly fails to pronounce a public
purpose and lacks any findings to support such a claim. The
Department of Justice ("DOJ") expressed this very concern in a
letter to the House of Representatives prior to NAGPRA's
enactment, stating that while "courts generally will defer to
Congress' determination of what constitutes a 'public use' . . .
Congress has inserted no findings in [NAGPRA] to explain how
the transfer of protected objects . . . to Native American tribes will

advance the public good." See Letter from the Dep't of Justice to
Morris K. Udall [hereinafter "Letter"] (Sept. 17, 1990), available
at http://archnet.asu.edu/topical/crm/usdocs/nagpral l.htm. The
DOJ admonished Congress that the absence of such findings could
pose legal issues under the Takings Clause, stating, "[s]hould
Congress wish to reach private property through these bills, it
would be advisable that such findings be included." Id. Congress
disregarded this warning, and NAGPRA was enacted without
including a single finding that the statute serves a public purpose.
While NAGPRA may in fact serve many important public
purposes,'0 the utter failure of Congress to speak to any of these
purposes in the text does not survive even the minimal, deferential
scrutiny of this Court's takings jurisprudence.
10. For example, proponents of NAGPRA have emphasized that the statute
is first and foremost, a civil rights measure designed to rectify centuries of civil
rights abuses against "America's first citizens"-a goal that unquestionably
serves an invaluable public purpose. Richman, supra, at 220; Jack F. Trope &
Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and
RepatriationAct: Background and Legislative History, in The Future of the Past
9, 22 (Tamara L. Bray, ed. 2001). Whether or not the statute serves such a
purpose, however, is irrelevant for purposes of this Court's Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence absent any legislative articulation.
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Third, even if this Court determines that NAGPRA does serve a
public purpose, transferring ownership of the jars is nonetheless an
unconstitutional taking because NAGPRA does not contain any
compensation provisions to "just[ly] compensate" Dr. Williamson
for the seizure of his personal property. Even when it is
permissible for the government to take private property for public
use, the Constitution mandates payment of "that just compensation
which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of a taking."
Berman, 348 U.S. at 36. NAGPRA provides for no such
compensation in the event that ownership of private property is
transferred to an Indian tribe from an individual, a museum or any
other institution covered by the statute. Prior to NAGPRA's
enactment, the DOJ also informed Congress that the absence of
such compensation provisions was constitutionally problematic
under the Fifth Amendment. See Letter, supra. While alternative
compensation procedures exist for private museums affected by
NAGPRA (see id), no such avenues exist to compensate Dr.
Williamson for the loss of the jars in the event of an ownership
transfer-jars valued at over $8,000 each at recent auctions.
Accordingly, vesting ownership in the Chaco Nation of the jars
discovered embedded in Dr. Williamson's property, without just
compensation and without a legislative articulation of public
purpose justifying the act, is an unconstitutional taking under the
Fifth Amendment.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Williamson respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit and find that: (1) under NAGPRA,
"Native American" human remains must bear some relationship to
a presently existing tribe, people or culture; and (2) vesting
ownership of the jars removed from Dr. Williamson's property
without just compensation violates the Fifth Amendment.
Respectfully submitted,

Attorneys for Petitioner
Team: G*
January 10, 2013

* DePaul University College of Law hosts the annual National Cultural Heritage
Moot Court Competition. In recognition of the excellence of the competitors,
the Journal of Art, Technology and Intellectual Property Law is pleased to
present the 2013 winning brief from the University of Michigan Law School
Team. The team members are: Austin E. Anderson, University of Michigan Law
School, J.D. Candidate, Dec. 2014; Kelly E. Fabian, University of Michigan
Law School, J.D. Candidate, May 2015; Stephanie M. Goldfarb, University of
Michigan Law School, J.D. Candidate, May 2014. Please note that the Table of
Contents, Table of Authorities, and Appendix were omitted.
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